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Simonett: Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft No. 2

DISPELLING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYNDROME:
TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2 OF THE RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)
John E. Simonett
In the beginning, products liability law asked the question:
"How might the fault in an inanimate object become the fault
of the maker of the object?" Making sense of this question was
not easy because the question uses "fault" in two different
senses.
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts'
("Tentative Draft") tells the story of how the bar and the courts
have struggled with products liability law over the past thirty
years. Much has happened. Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts2 was adopted in 1965 and consists of one
section with seventeen comments. The latest draft has four
topics, thirteen sections with seventy-nine comments, plus
detailed reporters' notes. While much has happened, one is left
with the impression that the law has come full circle. Except for
the manufacturing defect, products liability law now appears to
be pretty much negligence tort law but with its own idiosyncratic
features.
In this issue of the William Mitchell Law Review, experienced
practitioners present thoughtful essays on critical provisions of
the Tentative Draft. This introduction provides an overview of
the draft, pointing out some areas where old problems of strict
liability have been laid to rest, where some problems remain,
and where new questions are surfacing. In an introduction, one
has the luxury of skimming the surface, alighting briefly here
and there, and leaving the heavy spade-work to others.

t John E. Simonett was Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court from
September 1980 untilJune 1994. Since his retirement from the court, he practices law
with Greene Espel in Minneapolis. Prior to his appointment to the court, he practiced
law in Little Falls, Minnesota.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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I. Introduction
In the sixties and early seventies, the courts worried about
privity between the seller and others. Most remnants of
warranty law have now been shrugged off. Privity is no longer
a problem, nor are notice requirements and disclaimers.' In
the early years, too, courts worried about whether the affirmative
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory and comparative
fault applied to strict liability. Here, again, that problem is
resolved; affirmative defenses are available in Minnesota4 and
most states. The Tentative Draft is in accord. 5
Of more immediate interest, however, is recognition in the
Tentative Draft that there are three distinct kinds of product
defect, each with its own standard of liability: "A product is
defective if, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings."6 This section
accurately reflects current case law. Interestingly enough, the
old Section 402A never really said what constituted a defect;
instead, the section described a "defect" in terms of its ensuing
consequences, i.e., a defect was whatever made the product
unreasonably dangerous.7 This is reminiscent of medical practice,
where, if a patient's low back hurts for some unknown reason,
the patient is said to have a "lumbar disc syndrome." Section
402A, in effect, defined a "defect" as a "products liability
syndrome."
Tentative Draft No. 2 effectively dispels this
syndrome by identifying the defect itself.
The classic case for strict liability, at least in the beginning,
was, of course, the manufacturing defect, which presented a
condition much like res ipsa loquitur in negligence law.8 With
strict liability, the defect was a flaw physically present in the
product. But where products liability law has really flourished
3. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 13 (invalidating disclaimers on new
products that attempt to bar or limit claims by plaintiffs for personal injury). However,
disclaimers can be effective for sales of used products. See id. § 9(c)(1).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1994).
5.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 12 cmt. b and Reporters' Note.

6. Id. § 1(b).
7.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A(1) (1965) ("One who sells any

product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user ... or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused ...
8.

Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 3 cmt. a.
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in the past three decades is in cases of design defect and failure
to warn. In these cases, the product is structurally and functionally sound, yet harm has occurred; the defect, if there is one,
must then be sought elsewhere, outside the product itself. The
choices include the product's design or its operating instructions
or warnings. In other words, the focus shifts from the product
itself to the maker of the product. This focus is on the conduct
of human actors, which traditionally has been the domain of
negligence law. And so we come full circle.
It should come as no surprise then that the major debate in
products liability law has been over the test for a design defect,
whether it should be a "conscious design choice" test or a
"consumer expectation" standard. Except for food cases where
consumer expectations govern,9 the Tentative Draft opts for a
conscious design test which requires, as a predicate for a design
defect, proof of a reasonable alternative design.' ° After a
review of Minnesota cases, the Reporters' Note states, "A fair
reading of Minnesota law is that for the majority of design
defect cases proof of a reasonable alternative is necessary."1
Other articles in this issue of the law review discuss in depth the
implications of an alternative design test with its risk-utility
balancing approach.
There is irony in the emergence of the design defect in
products liability law. One of the early rationales for strict
liability was to reduce transactional costs by relieving the plaintiff
from the burden of proving fault on the manufacturer.12 But,
if anything, proof of a design defect today requires employment
of a host of experts, no different practically than for a negligence suit.

9. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
10. Id. § 2(b) and cmL e; see also id. Reporters' Note to cmt. c. Interestingly, in
determining what may be a reasonable alternative design, the court may consider as
one of the relevant factors "the nature and strength of consumer expectations." Id. § 2

cmt. e.
11. Id. § 2 Reporters' Note to cmt. c (citing Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324
N.W.2d 207, 212-13 (Minn. 1982); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn.
1984); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987)).

Section 398 of the Restatement (Second) covers negligence claims for "Chattels Made
Under Dangerous Plan or Design," and says, simply, that a manufacturer will be liable
for "failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965). Will proof of negligence, as for strict
liability, henceforth require a showing of a reasonable alternative design?
12. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 Reporters' Note to cmt. a.
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The Tentative Draft takes notice of practical problems
which had arisen over the manner of submitting a products
liability case to the jury. Because of the overlap in negligence,
strict liability and warranty claims, it was found that submitting
duplicate theories of recovery to a jury caused confusion and
created a risk of perverse verdicts. Minnesota resolved this
problem by not allowing submission of duplicate claims."3 The
Tentative Draft takes a similar position. 4
Any practitioner with a failure to warn case will profit from
the analysis given this subject in the Tentative Draft. 5 Because
failure to warn claims are relatively easy to assert, especially with
the advantage of post-accident hindsight, and because failure-towarn will lie where the product is not defective in design or
manufacture, it is important that the courts carefully oversee the
legitimacy of these types of claims. Apparently it was with these
concerns in mind that the court in Germann v. EL. Smithe
Machine Co.,' 6 stated that "whether a legal duty to warn exists
is a question of law for the court"; 7 and if the danger should
have been reasonably foreseeable, "the courts then hold as a
matter of law a duty exists."" The jury, noted the court, is
then left with the issues of adequacy of the warning, breach of
duty, and causation. The Germann court went on to hold, in the
case before it, that the defendant manufacturer could have
foreseen that the owner of the hydraulic press would remove the
safety bar, and therefore the manufacturer (not just the owneruser of the press) had a "legal duty" to warn operators of the

13.

Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984) (holding that

the plaintiff can plead and prove both negligence and failure to warn but, after the

parties rest, the plaintiff must choose one of the two theories to go to the jury); see also
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 100 (Minn. 1987) (stating a preference for
separate interrogatories on verdict form when plaintiff alleges alternate bases for

recovery).
14. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. m. This section, entitled
Relationshipof definitions of defect to traditionaldoctrinalcategories, states as follows: "[T]wo
or more factually identical defective design claims under § 2(b), or two or more

factually identical failure-to-warn claims under § 2(c), may not be submitted to the trier
of fact in the same case under different doctrinal labels. Thus, for example, if a design
claim is characterized as 'strict liability,' a 'negligence' design claim on the same facts
should not be allowed." Id.

15. Id. § 2 cmts. h-n.
16.

395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986).

17. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986).
18.

Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss2/9

4

1995]

Simonett: Dispelling thePRODUCTS
Products Liability
Syndrome: Tentative Draft No. 2
LIABILITY

peril of operating the press without the safety bar attached.19
Some of the language in Germann has been interpreted to mean
that a jury never decides whether a duty to warn exists.
The trial court must decide, of course, based on the
evidence, whether to submit the issue of failure to warn to the
jury. This is a question of law for the court. Put another way,
it is a question of law for the judge whether there is a question
of fact for the jury. In submitting a failure to warn claim to the
jury, the trial court ordinarily is instructing the jury to determine from all the evidence if, in fact, the risk to be warned
against was reasonably foreseeable, so that a duty to warn was
necessary; and if so, whether any warnings were adequate or
could have been effective (which relates to the scope of the
duty); and, finally, whether the duty was breached and causation
was present. In a particular case, one or more of these questions may be decided by the trial court as a matter of law and
the jury so told. But otherwise, generally, the jury decides if a
duty to warn exists and if it was breached."
Section 402A left open the question whether strict liability
applies to the seller of a component part for a product to be
assembled. The Tentative Draft now
resolves this question,
21
stating that strict liability does apply.
Except for damage to the defective product itself, Section
6 of the Tentative Draft excludes from a strict liability recovery
"economic loss" other than that resulting from harm to the

19.

Id. at 925.

20.

See MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,

MINNESOTAJURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 119, in 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE 1, at
90 (3d ed. 1986).
As Section 2(c) of the Tentative Draft explains, a manufacturer or seller has a duty
to provide reasonable instructions or warnings where the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided and where the absence of
such instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
In Germann there was conflicting lay and expert testimony on whether the
defendant manufacturer should have to warn about using the press without the
designed safety feature attached. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 926. By submitting the issue
to the jury, the trial court was telling the jury that it could find the manufacturer, not
just the owner-user of the press, had a duty to warn. Because it was undisputed that
the manufacturer had given no warning about using the press without the safety guard,
there was no issue for the jury on whether, if a duty existed, there had been an
adequate warning. No warning, as a matter of law, would be inadequate.
21. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 4 Reporters' Note to cmt. b. If the
component part loses its identity as a separate product, strict liability no longer applies
to it.
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plaintiff's person or harm to the plaintiff's property.22 Minnesota has also dealt legislatively with the problem of strict liability
for non-manufacturer sellers.23
II. Second
Brief mention should be made of some aspects of strict
liability left open in the Tentative Draft and some of the areas
where the law is still developing. The Restatement, it should be
remembered, is not the law in Minnesota until the Minnesota
Courts say it is. The Restatement does not purport to make law
but to distill the current state of judicial opinions and scholarly
comment. Because it does its work well, the Restatement's
pronouncements are deservedly influential. And because the
law is constantly developing, Tentative Draft No. 2 is not
necessarily final any more than Section 402A was the final word.
Justice Holmes once remarked that if a case is an easy one,
the judge decides as a question of law; if it is a hard one, it is a
question of fact for the jury.2 4 One of the hardest questions in
strict liability is what constitutes a design defect and a reasonable
alternative design. 25 Here a judgment must be made involving
aesthetics, engineering, behavioral sciences, economics, cost
accounting, and marketing. These considerations can present
the trial judge with difficult rulings on the admissibility of
evidence and the use of experts. If unsafe design is submitted
to the jury, the trial judge must decide what guidance to give
the jury. Should there be a general instruction about "reasonableness," or should the jury be told of the same risk-utility

22. Compare Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 6, with MINN. STAT. § 604.10
(1994) (providing that economic loss arising from sales between "merchants in goods
of the kind [is] not recoverable in tort") and Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.,
491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992) (same).
23. SeeMINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1994) (requiring the dismissal ofa non-manufacturer

under certain specified circumstances); cf.Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1 cmt.
e.
24. JUSTICE HOLMES, Ex CATHEDRA 267 (EdwardJ. Bander ed., 1966).

25. In some cases, it may be difficult to distinguish between defective design and
a manufacturing defect or a failure to warn. "Instructions and warnings accompanying
the product are relevant to the question of defective design and in some cases adequate
instructions and warnings will suffice to render the product nondefective." Tentative
Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. k.
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factors that the trial judge took into consideration in allowing
the issue to go to the jury? This is not an easy question. 6
The Tentative Draft says it "takes no position regarding the
specifics of how a jury should be instructed" for a design
defect.2 7 The difficulty is that the jury is being asked to
undertake an unaccustomed role, or so it seems. Rather than
applying an objective standard of care, the jury is asked to sit
like a court in equity, balancing risk versus utility, weighing
various engineering, cost and marketing trade-offs, so that a
finding of the presence or absence of a design defect appears
more as an equitable remedy than a tort verdict of fault. To
avoid undue diffusion of the standard of care it will be important that jury instructions and special verdict questions be
devised in particular cases to provide an adequate analytic
structure for the jury's deliberation.
Other questions are left open too. The validity of disclaimers between parties is left by the Institute "to developing case
law." 2
A few states have adopted "proportional liability" in
drug cases where the plaintiff cannot identify the particular
defendant who caused the harm. Here, the Institute "leaves to
developing law" whether such a rule should be adopted.29
Over the years it has come to be recognized that drug
products are unique cases for strict liability, and much discussion has centered about Comment k of Section 402A dealing
with "unavoidably unsafe products." The Tentative Draft brings
up to date the law which has extensively developed in this
area.

3

0

Section 11 of the Tentative Draft deals with increased harm
due to a product defect, a problem that arises particularly in
automobile crashworthiness cases.
Section 4 defines "product" generally as tangible personal
property, but then cites somewhat exotic examples worthy of a
law school examination. There is some authority, says the
Tentative Draft, for considering sales of land developers and
mass-builders as "products." And might computer software be

26. See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 101 (Minn. 1987) (Simonett, J.,
concurring).
27. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e.
28. Id. § 6cmt. f.
29. Id. § 10 cmt. c.
30. Id. § 8.
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subject to strict liability, at least when mass-marketed, or will
warranty claims under the Uniform Commercial Code provide
an adequate remedy?"1
III.

Third

We live in a post-industrial society characterized by rapidly
advancing technology where goods are being produced on a
massive scale as never before, with demand for these goods fed
by increasingly adept marketing techniques. In this environment it would seem reasonable that tort law should take
measures to assure that those who make and sell goods and
products have a responsibility to make them reasonably safe. It
is in this context that "strict liability" developed.
Tentative Draft No. 2 comes at a time when there is a
clamor for "tort reform" in strict liability, presumably based on
a perceived imbalance in what is fair to require of the producerseller of products as compared to what is fair for the userconsumer to expect. In the nature of things, these two interests
will always be in a state of tension and aberrations will occur.
But generally speaking, over the past thirty years, products
liability law has kept in mind its purpose to provide, fairly,
products that are reasonably safe.
Products liability law has, however, suffered from guilt by
association, i.e., with the associated problems of punitive
damages and the high transactional costs of products litigaThese problems are outside the scope of the Tentative
tion.
Draft but will continue to affect products liability.
As indicated at the beginning of this introduction, it
appears strict liability is becoming more like negligence law with
its traditional standard of reasonable care adapted to the special
circumstances of products liability. Tentative Draft No. 2 is an
invaluable contribution to the ongoing development of products
liability law.

31. Id. § 4 cmt. d. Here the Reporters state that while there are no cases on point
finding computer software a "product," numerous commentators have discussed that
possibility. Fortunately-at least for the Bar-the Tentative Draft states that a lawyer's
work product is not a product.
32. A recent survey of members of the Minnesota Bar reported that respondents
felt excessive discovery was most common in commercial and products liability cases
REPORT OF THE DISCOVERY TASK FORCE,
where the financial stakes are high.
MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1993).
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